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When does a major outbreak become a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern?
Could the pandemic of the century have been averted? 
The process by which WHO decides whether to declare 
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
(PHEIC) under the International Health Regulations 
has drawn criticism. Reports have condemned the 
4-month delay by WHO after the international spread 
of Ebola in west Africa before declaring a PHEIC.1 The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, now experiencing 
the second largest Ebola outbreak in recorded history, 
notified WHO of the outbreak on Aug 1, 2018, but 
WHO required four Emergency Committee meetings, 
including on Oct 17, 2018 (216 confirmed cases, 
139 deaths, and 64% case fatality ratio), and April 12 
and June 14, 2019 (four confirmed cases in Uganda). 
Justifying their response, the Emergency Committee said 
that “the cluster of cases in Uganda is not unexpected”.2 
A PHEIC was finally declared at the fourth Emergency 
Committee meeting on July 17, 2019 (2501 cases and 
1668 deaths), almost a year after initial notification. 
The International Health Regulations3 do not require 
actual international spread, only a high potential 
for that spread, and thus the criteria for a PHEIC had 
already been met by the second Emergency Committee 
meeting.4 Notably, the PHEIC declaration coincided with 
increased resourcing and international focus, leading to 
a major reduction in Ebola cases.
Global health scholars have criticised the Emergency 
Committee process as lacking transparency, using 
“irrelevant considerations, undue influence and 
political interference”,5 and delaying declaration when 
International Health Regulations criteria have been met. 
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak 
originating in China and reported to WHO on 
Dec 31, 2019, suggests that little has changed. The 
PHEIC declaration for COVID-19 occurred well after 
most public health experts had concluded that this 
outbreak posed a major international threat. At the 
first Emergency Committee meeting on Jan 22, 2020 
(309 cases and six deaths reported in mainland China; 
five confirmed cases in four countries or territories), 
the Emergency Committee said it did not have key 
facts from China. It extended the meeting to the next 
day, when cases had risen to 571, with 17 deaths and 
ten cases in seven other countries or territories. Yet, the 
Emergency Committee could not achieve consensus, 
and the Director-General concluded that the outbreak 
was “an emergency in China, but it had not yet become 
a global health emergency”.6
Again, the process appeared “more political than 
technical”, as a Lancet Editorial described Ebola in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, adding that “the 
committee seems to have favoured local protectiveness 
over global galvanising”.7 By the time the Emergency 
Committee declared a PHEIC for COVID-19 on 
Jan 30, 2020, 7736 cases and 179 deaths had been 
confirmed in mainland China, with 107 cases confirmed 
in 21 other countries.
Delays in declaring a PHEIC could have serious 
detrimental consequences, lulling governments and 
donors into a false sense of security, because they could 
reason that if WHO does not consider the situation an 
international emergency, then it does not require a 
surge response.
The legal definition of a PHEIC is clear, as “an 
extraordinary event that may constitute a public health 
risk to other countries through international spread of 
disease and may require an international coordinated 
response.”3 The purpose of the declaration is to focus 
international attention on acute public health risks 
that “require coordinated mobilisation of extraordinary 
resources by the inter national community” for 
prevention and response.3 
The PHEIC process requires urgent reform. First, the all-
or-nothing nature of the assessment generates confusion. 
We therefore propose a multilevel PHEIC process with 
each level defined by objective epidemiological criteria 
and paired with specific readiness actions. Level 1 PHEIC 
alert should indicate a high risk outbreak in a single 
country, with the potential for international spread 
requiring concerted public health efforts to contain and 
manage it locally. Level 2 PHEIC should imply that multiple 
countries have had importations and that limited spread 
has occurred in those countries. Level 3 PHEIC would 
indicate large clusters in multiple countries, with evidence 
of ongoing local transmission. This tiering would provide 
less ambiguous risk signalling, while also encouraging 
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earlier, proportionate public health measures when they 
are most effective.
Second, WHO should convene an expert consensus 
meeting to establish objective, evidence-based epi-
demiological and containment criteria to transparently 
guide its decision making processes. The draft algorithm 
under Annex 2 of the International Health Regulations8 
(appendix) already includes critical elements, but there 
are also subjective considerations, such as restraints on 
international travel and trade. The algorithm contains 
perverse relative weightings, treating the five categories 
as equivalent.
The clear purpose of a PHEIC declaration is to catalyse 
timely evidence-based action, to spur increased inter-
national funding and support, and to limit the public 
health and societal impacts of emerging and re-
emerging disease risks. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 
pandemic, International Health Regulation reform must 
be an ethical imperative for more rapid and effective 
responses to novel infectious diseases.
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